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Abstract
Because transportation in the San Francisco Bay Area is increasingly dependent on
electricity, factors such as limited electricity storage capacity and nontransferability of
batteries between vehicles need to be considered by emergency response planners
(ERPs). The purpose of this study was to investigate planning for providing the power to
provide emergency transportation for hospital staff/administration and those injured after
earthquakes. The research questions of transportation need of emergency staff and
patients after an earthquake and differences between Bay Area cities and counties in
considering transportation needs were addressed in this qualitative study utilizing a
collective case study to assess electric vehicle use as articulated in 48 public emergency
management and health agency documents that discussed post-disaster transportation
planning. Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum’s community resilience
theory served as the theoretical lens for analyzing the impacts of electric transportation
on hospitals. Some ERPs included transportation fuel in their documents, whereas ERPs
specifically focused on transportation did not. The review, coding, and analysis yielded 2
primary themes: fuel for emergency planning is focused primarily on fuel for generators,
with few documents discussing fuel for transportation; many documents lack currency
with 28 updated before 2015 or not having an identifiable date. Community resilience
from disruption is likely to lead to a state of vulnerability as well as a disconnection
between community resilience theory and ERP planning. The implication for positive
social change is to help Bay Area ERPs understand how to increase community resilience
by including adaptation to changes in transportation fuel sources in their plans.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Between 2011 and January 2017, 269,000 plug-in electric vehicles had been sold
in California (California Plug-In Electric Vehicle Collaborative, 2017). In California,
ground-based transportation is increasingly reliant on electricity as an alternative to
hydrocarbon-based fuels, with an estimate of up to 3.5 million electric vehicles on the
road by 2020 (California Energy Commission, 2012). Between 2012 and 2015, 49% of
electric vehicle purchasers had graduate degrees, 34% had bachelor’s degrees, and 10%
had some level of college education (California Clean Vehicle Rebate Project, 2015).
Hospital staff tend to have higher educational attainment than the general public, but they
use ground-based transportation to get to work, which means that they are subject to
barriers in ground-based transportation after a disaster (Adams & Berry, 2012; Frenk et
al., 2010).
In this qualitative case study, I examined how city and county health care and
transportation agencies consider the increased prevalence and reliance on electric
transportation, including mass transit, in their plans. Without sufficient planning for this
volume of electric vehicles, emergency hospital services after an earthquake are likely to
be degraded, leading to a lower quality of care for impacted individuals, particularly
those with higher social vulnerability (Schmidtlein, Shafer, Berry, & Cutter, 2011). There
is a lack of relevant and recent studies on earthquakes and emergency services; studies
have been focused on other major natural disasters where implications for significant
infrastructure damage exist. However, areas outside of the San Francisco Bay Area
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(termed the Bay Area throughout this dissertation) have been studied for natural disaster
impacts on transportation and included in the literature review to provide further breadth
and support for the existing gap in the research that I addressed in my research. In
Chapter 1, I provide a background and overview of the gap in the literature. In the rest of
Chapter 1, I discuss the problem statement, study purpose, research questions, study
framework, the qualitative nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, delimitations,
and limitations, and the significance of the study.
Background
The Bay Area is home to more than 7.5 million people across Alameda, Contra
Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma
counties (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014b). As represented in Figure 1, the Bay Area is
defined by the San Francisco Bay, which divides the area into San Francisco and the
peninsula to the west, and the North, East, and South Bays respectively (Google Maps,
2015). According to the 2010 U.S. Census Bureau (2014a), San Francisco-OaklandFremont is the 11th largest metropolitan area in the United States, and San Jose,
Sunnyvale, and Santa Clara is the 31st largest metropolitan area. Combined they would
be the fifth largest area, after the Dallas, Fort Worth, and Arlington areas. The Port of
Oakland is the fifth largest shipping port by containers in the United States (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2014). From north to south, the following bridges cross
San Francisco Bay: Richmond, Bay, San Mateo, and Dumbarton. The Golden Gate
Bridge runs north to south, connecting the North Bay with San Francisco.
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Figure 1. Bay Area geography and major highways. From San Francisco Bay Area
bridges map en, by A. Karnstedt, n.d. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0.
As shown in Figure 1, Bay Area transportation is dependent on bridges to shorten
travel distances. Without considering transportation limitations, more people may be
placed at risk of not receiving adequate health care after a disaster, particularly the
elderly and those living and working in older buildings more susceptible to damage
(Peek-Asa et al., 1998). This is a concern because of the number of earthquakes that
California experiences.
Natural disasters such as earthquakes pose a significant threat to lives and
property. The three major earthquakes in the Bay Area since 1900 include the 1906 San
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Francisco earthquake (with a 7.9 Richter scale magnitude that killed 3,000 people and
caused over $500 million in damage), the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake near Santa Cruz
(with a 6.9 magnitude, injuring 3,800 and killing 63, $6 billion in damage; Durkin, Thiel,
& Schneider, 1993; U.S. Geological Survey, 2014a), and the 2014 South Napa
earthquake (with a 6.0 magnitude, which caused approximately $1 billion in damage;
California Department of Conservation, 2013; U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.). One fatality
and approximately 200 injuries were associated with the South Napa earthquake
(Todorov, 2014). The Loma Prieta earthquake caused one section of the upper level of
the eastern span of the Bay Bridge and the Cypress Street Viaduct in Oakland (a major
section of a double deck roadway) to collapse, and it caused the closure of 11 bridges and
numerous roads (Yashinsky, 1998). Other parts of California and the world have
experienced similar disasters.
Outside of the Bay Area in California, other major earthquakes with large
fatalities include the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, with 65 deaths and $50 million in
damages, the 1933 earthquake near Long Beach, which killed 115, and the 1994
Northridge earthquake which killed 61 (California Department of Conservation, 2013).
The Northridge earthquake also injured more than 9,000 people, damaged or collapsed
170 freeway bridges, and caused over $20 billion in economic harm (Updike et al., 1996).
Table 1 identifies these selected earthquakes by Richter scale, years, fatalities, and cost.
Values for fatalities and costs have some variation between the articles and the California
Department of Conservation.
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Table 1
Select Major California Earthquakes by Richter Scale, Year, Fatalities, and Cost

Name

Richter Scale

Year

Fatalities

Cost ($ million)

Loma Prieta

6.9

1989

63

6,000

Long Beach

6.4

1933

115

N/A

Northridge

6.7

1994

61

>15,000

San Fernando

6.5

1971

65

50

San Francisco

7.9

1906

>3,000

500

South Napaa

6.0a

2014a

1b

1,000a

Note. Data for earthquakes except the South Napa earthquake from California
Department of Conservation (2017).
a

California Department of Conservation, 2013; U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.

b

Todorov, 2014
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Figure 2. U.S. Geological Survey map of fault line rupture at 6.7 magnitude or greater
chances between 2007 and 2036. (U.S. Geological Survey, 2012).
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The sum of the probabilities of a 6.7 magnitude earthquake or greater in the Bay
Area by 2036 is 63%. The major fault lines parallel the major north-south highways, and
as demonstrated in the Loma Prieta earthquake can destroy east-west infrastructure a
significant distance away from the rupture site. Figure 3 is a combined image of major
highways, fault lines, and counties in the Bay Area. As shown, the major highways cross
or run parallel to the major fault lines likely to rupture over the next decades.

Figure 3. Bay Area map with major roadways in mid grey, earthquake fault lines in
black, and counties identified (California Department of Conservation, 2012).
Damaged infrastructure, particularly transportation infrastructure, can play an
important role in the ability of individuals to provide and receive medical care. The
California Hospital Association (2011) provided guidelines for emergency management
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programs and an emergency operations plan that included several categories related to
transportation. Transporting professional and technical staff as well as key administrators
to hospitals in emergencies is essential to operations. Most studies on natural disaster
preparedness have been focused on patients and supplies getting to hospitals or
evacuations, as I will discuss further in Chapter 2 (Ardagh et al., 2012; Litman, 2006;
Mieler & Brechwald, 2013; Paturas, Smith, Stewart, & Albanese, 2010; Sisiopiku, 2007).
However, determining the willingness and ability of staff/administrators to return
to hospitals during natural disasters and identifying any barriers is also important. For
example, Adams and Berry (2012) found in their survey of 1,342 staff that, depending on
the scenario, between 10% and 30% of participants indicated they may not be able to
report to work. Additionally, tornadoes or flooding (p = .047) had the lowest percentage
of participants (75% with children able to report to work for tornadoes, and 68% with
children able to report to work with flooding) who may report to work. One of the
significant factors identified was transportation limitations by 200 or approximately 15%
of participants (Adams & Berry, 2012).
Compounding a general transportation issue during disasters is the increasing use
of electrified transportation, such as San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency and
Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) or Caltrain, which include light and heavy rail and
electric buses and cars. For safety reasons, even mass transit systems such as BART,
which have backup systems to maintain core system functionality, can be shut down
when power failures result in fans not operating and insufficient lighting in stations
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(BART, 2005). Transportation systems are dependent on power (Procyk & Dhariwal
(2010),and properly preparing for a disaster requires a hazard vulnerability analysis to
prepare, respond, and recover from a disaster (Barbera & Macintyre, 2007). As electric
transportation use increases, emergency response planners (ERPs) need to take the
increased electric dependency and vehicle ranges into account. For the Bay Area, this
means mass transit and electric cars in addition to more traditional vehicles that use
petroleum-based fuels and other modes of transportation.
Problem Statement
Modes of transportation are subject to disruption during an earthquake or even
during the normal course of events that can hamper transportation (BART, 2005).
Approximately 280,000 cars, trucks, and motorcycles use the San Francisco–Oakland
Bay Bridge daily (California Department of Transportation, 2015). Additionally, four
hundred thousand people a day transit the San Francisco Bay using BART (BART,
2013). The San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (2014) reported 702,000
weekday boardings on average in 2014. Caltrain (2015) reported 58,000 average
weekday boardings in 2014. The boardings for Caltrain more likely reflect two one-way
trips per person, whereas the San Francisco Municipal Transit Authority boarding
numbers likely reflect several transfers per person to get from the origination to
destination and back. Finally, the California Center for Sustainable Energy (2013)
reported that 39% of electric vehicle owners in California live in the Bay Area. Figure 4
shows many of the electric vehicle charging stations in California (U.S. Department of
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Energy, 2016). BART relies on electricity to keep stations safe and power its trains
(BART, 2015). The BART, Caltrain, and Municipal Transportation Agency ridership
levels, combined with the growth of electric vehicle owners, demonstrate the vital role of
electric transportation to the Bay Area.

Figure 4. Bay Area map of electric vehicle charging stations (U.S. Department of
Energy, 2016).
Emergency response planning for hospitals incorporates transportation issues but
not always the implications of transportation choices. The California Hospital
Association (2011) has provided an emergency checklist to help hospitals prepare for
emergencies and disaster planning that has three elements regarding transportation. First
is management of resources and assets, which includes transporting patients, records,
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staff/administrators, and supplies during an evacuation. Second is management of safety
and security, which includes controlling access and movement (people and vehicles).
Third is management of utilities, provision, sustainability, and alternate means of
providing electricity and fuel.
Based on the literature review, few scholars have focused on how
staff/administration may be able to arrive at hospitals after an earthquake or other types
of disasters. Most notably, Hess, Bednarz, Bae, and Pierce (2011) examined petroleum
shortage impacts on hospital staffing, but they did not consider how transportation reliant
on electricity would further hinder or resolve problems caused by petroleum shortages.
Additionally, Villez, Gupta, Venkatasubramanian, and Rieger (2011) explored the
resiliency of vehicle recharging networks but focused more on smaller disruptions to the
charging stations and distances to the next charging station rather than how a disaster like
an earthquake can damage or destroy a broad area of infrastructure. In general, scholars
on electric transportation have focused on meeting environmental objectives (Deakin,
2011; Deakin & Kim, 2001; Recker & Kang, 2010; Sikes, Hadley, McGill, & Cleary,
2010). Accordingly, there is a gap in transportation and emergency planning literature
regarding the implications of increased electric transportation use. In particular, ERPs
need to understand how existing and increased usage of electricity powered
transportation will affect their emergency management programs, given that 52% of
electric car owners have postgraduate degrees, and therefore, hospital staff are more
likely to have an electric vehicle (California Center for Sustainable Energy, 2013). These
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concerns are grounded in public policy through emergency management and homeland
security concerns as discussed by Longstaff (2005), who addressed security and
resilience in the context of disasters or complex technologies.
Study Purpose
To assess the impacts of transportation electrification on emergency response
planning as resulting from hospital staff/administration and potential patients using
electric transportation, in this case study I examined data from 41 city and county-level
organizations in the Bay Area. I compared the documentation from county and city
departments of public health, departments of transportation, and emergency management
departments to examine how and if electrified transportation is considered in the role of
bringing hospital staff/administration and injured persons to hospitals.
A case study was appropriate because my central focus was on how public
documents by county and city departments of public health, transportation, and
emergency management document the impacts of transportation electrification on
hospital emergency responses during and after an earthquake in the Bay Area. My case
study was focused on what descriptions are in planning documents and the implications
rather than on past events (see Yin, 2014). The study was bounded by the geography of
the Bay Area and focused on city and county existing response plans during and after
earthquakes.
Bay Area trauma centers are generally divided by geography yet are located
closely enough that a major disaster could impact them all as demonstrated by the Loma
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Prieta earthquake (Durkin et al., 1993). Within the Bay Area, the 13 trauma centers are
bounded by Santa Rosa Memorial in the northwest, Kaiser in Vacaville in the northeast,
Stanford University Hospital in the southwest, and Regional Medical Center of San Jose
in the southeast (California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development,
2010). Figure 5 shows the locations of the major trauma centers. Table 2 lists the Bay
Area trauma centers including bed and type of trauma license according to the California
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, from the greatest number of beds
to the least. Level I centers can provide the highest degree of care including extensive inhouse specialists and often have associated research centers, whereas Level III centers
can provide most care though emergency doctors and general surgeons rather than the
dedicated specialists in Level I and II centers (American Trauma Society, 2016).
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Figure 5. Locations of major trauma centers in the Bay Area. Dark dots represent
locations of the 13 major trauma centers in the Bay Area and the grey lines indicate major
roadways (California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development, 2010).
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Table 2
Bay Area Trauma Centers by City, Number of Beds, and Trauma License
Name

City

Stanford University Hospital

Palo Alto

Santa Clara Valley Medical Center

Beds

License

Ped.

613

I

II

San Jose

574

I

II

John Muir Medical Center

Walnut Creek

572

II

San Francisco General

San Francisco

539

I

Alameda County Highland Medical Center

Oakland

286

II

Santa Rosa Memorial

Santa Rosa

278

II

Regional Medical Center of San Jose

San Jose

249

II

Marin General

Greenbrae

235

III

Queen of the Valley

Napa

211

III

Children’s Hospital of Oakland

Oakland

190

Kaiser

Vacaville

140

III

North Bay Medical Center

Fairfield

132

III

Eden Medical Center

Castro Valley

130

II

Total Beds:

4,149

I

Trauma centers were an appropriate location for inclusion in the study because
they among the primary locations where injured people will go or be taken, and the staff
who can treat them, after a disaster (California Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development, 2010; Lee et al., 2016). Reviewing planning documents from city and
county departments of health, transportation, and emergency management demonstrated
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how and the extent to which transportation electrification concerns are being considered
in public forums.
Research Questions
The following research questions were driven by the gaps in the literature. There
was a need to identify the aspects of transportation that limit health care access as well as
measuring the impact of transportation policy and interventions (Syed, Gerber, and
Sharp, 2013). Additionally, crisis care plans must include transportation and adequate
staffing, and systems and processes are critical to meeting surge capacity (Hick, Barbera,
and Kelen, 2013).
Research Question 1: From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response
planners, as demonstrated through public documents, are key factors, if any, do they take
into account when considering transportation needs of staff/administration reporting to
work after an earthquake?
Research Question 2: From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response
planners, as demonstrated through public documents, what are the key factors that they
take into account when considering transportation needs of individuals needing assistance
after an earthquake?
Research Question 3: What are the differences in the emergency response plans
for electric transportation between cities and counties in the Bay Area?
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Theoretical Framework
Preparedness is a core tenet of providing emergency response (California Hospital
Association, 2011; Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.; McEntire, 2009).
ERPs need to consider and understand what transportation modes hospital
staff/administration use. How electrification of transportation is considered in ERP
emergency planning drove the need for this collective case study comparing written and
oral information. Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, and Pfefferbaum’s (2007)
community resilience served as the theoretical lens. Although Holling (1973) first
developed the concept of resilience within ecological systems, Norris et al. applied
resilience to communities and identified resilience as “processes linking a network of
adaptive capacities (resources with dynamic attributes) to adaptation after a disturbance
or adversity” (p. 127). A key component of the community resilience definition is the
linkages in the network and that transportation can provide many of those linkages. For
example, if individuals’ transportation shifts from individual cars (or types of fuels) to
ferries or trains, then a system would be fairly adaptive. However, with increasing
electrification, the transportation system becomes more tightly linked to the electric grid,
which is vulnerable to disruption because current storage capacities are limited.
Accordingly, community resilience formed the foundation of the study.
Although resilience has many differing usages between the engineering and
ecological contexts, the usage applied to this study began with Holling’s (1973) work in
the 1970s with a focus on human development. Since Holling’s original work in the
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1970s, resilience has evolved as the emergency management and homeland security
fields sought new tools to examine how communities and infrastructure respond to crises.
One emergent concern is what impact increasing efforts to electrify transportation will
have on community resilience. The Bay Area is susceptible to disruption associated with
earthquakes and is on the forefront of environmental and ecological issues. In Chapter 2,
I discuss earthquakes and other disasters, transportation, and the role of community
resilience in the present study. A collective case study approach allowed me to use the
theoretical framework to examine several bounded examples to assess how ERPs and
health care planning are taking into consideration a disruptive new form of technology,
and how that technological change may impact the resilience of the communities that rely
upon hospital services and may be affected by electric transportation.
Nature of the Study
The Bay Area departments of emergency management, health, and transportation
were appropriate locations for a study on earthquake disaster resilience because they are
the designated points for treating disaster-related injuries. I evaluated the perceptions of
the ERPs, as measured through public documents located on 41 city and county websites.
I conducted one type of data collection: review of policies and planning documents
related to transportation and earthquake response. Document selection is covered in
Chapter 3 on methodology.
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Definition of Terms
Adaptive management: Decision-making based on an iterative learning process
that is focused not only on changing a system but understanding the system itself. It was
adapted from the ecological and engineering disciplines (Berkes & Ross, 2013; Engle,
2011; Gunderson, 2010; Holling, 1973; Whicker, Janecky, & Doerr, 2008; Wise, 2006).
Bay Area: The area surrounding San Francisco Bay. This includes (from north to
south) Sonoma, Napa, Solano, Marin, Contra Costa, San Francisco, Alameda, San Mateo,
and Santa Clara counties. There are 101 cities and towns in the Bay Area, including San
Francisco and Oakland (Association of Bay Area Governments, 2013). Seven and a half
million people live in the Bay Area (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014b).
Community: The structure of a group of people, including subpopulations,
delineated by the group’s linkages of either geography or between individuals (Adger,
2000; Cutter et al., 2008; Norris et al., 2007). All communities are not equal, and
different parts of a community are more or less advantaged with resilience and resistance
capabilities (Adger, 2000).
Community resilience: The capability of a community to quickly adapt and return
to similar or improved function after a disruption, such as a natural disaster (Norris et al.,
2007, p. 130).
Disaster: An acute event, over a short period of time, caused by natural,
technological, or human causes that often leads to trauma (McFarlane & Norris, 2006, p.
4). In this study, a disaster generally referred to earthquakes unless otherwise noted.
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Electric transportation: A type of alternative fuel used for vehicles, such as
batteries or fuel cells, powered from the electrical grid (Deakin & Kim, 2001). This can
include heavy and light rail systems such as BART and municipal rail, buses, and
personal vehicles.
Emergency services providers: “Federal, State, and local governmental and
nongovernmental . . . emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities, and
related personnel, agencies, and authorities.” (6 U.S.C. § 101(6), 2016).
First responders: Includes police, fire, and emergency medical personnel (Public
Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, n.d.).
Resilience: A changed end-state after a surprise event (Adger, 2000; Longstaff &
Yang, 2008; Norris et al., 2007).
Resilience (ecological): The ability to return to a similar or improved level of
overall system function, but not necessarily a stable state (Adger, 2000).
Resilience (engineering): Either a return to the previous state or to a new stable
state after a disruption (Leveson et al., 2006).
Resistance: A postdisaster state where no change has occurred from the
predisaster function (Longstaff, 2005; Longstaff & Yang, 2008).
Surge capacity: The capability to manage a sudden increase in hospital demands,
typically after a major accident or disaster (Hick et al., 2013).
Vulnerability: An undesired outcome caused by a system becoming worse-off
after a surprise and on a downward trajectory (Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003).
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Vulnerability (social): “The exposure of groups of people or individuals to stress as a
result of the impacts of environmental change” (Adger, 2000, p. 348).
Assumptions
This research was based on the following assumptions. The first assumption was
that a significantly powerful earthquake will occur in or near the Bay Area that will
damage infrastructure. On the Modified Mercalli scale, this would be a level VIII or
greater earthquake. The Modified Mercalli scale is an arbitrary, nonmathematical
intensity scale designed to help measure the impact of earthquakes (U.S. Geological
Survey, 2014b). Level VIII is explained as “damage slight in specially designed
structures; considerable damage in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse.
Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chmineys [sic], factory stacks, columns,
monuments, walls. Heavy furniture overturned” (U.S. Geological Survey, 2013, para.
12). The Mercalli scale is a relative scale as ranked by human observation, as compared
to the Richter scale, which is an absolute recorded measurement.
The second assumption was that documents with adequate responses would be
available. Because confidential information was not collected for the study and the public
nature of the documentation, there is no expectation that the documents would contain
inaccurate statements or falsehoods. However, just because the documents are public
does not mean they are valid (Cho & Trent, 2006). The third assumption was that
available electronic or written materials would be current, accurate, and address the
questions raised. The fourth assumption was that the electrified transportation I
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considered was purely electric, such as BART, and vehicles like the Nissan Leaf. Hybrid
electric transportation, such as the Toyota Prius or electric-gas buses, can operate solely
on gasoline, and thus have fewer range limitations when the electric grid or transportation
networks fail, although gas pumps do require electricity to function.
Scope and Delimitations
The study was focused on electric transportation and the implications in a
geographically constrained area. Geographically constrained areas in the United States,
such as the Bay Area, also contain major population centers. This boundary narrowed the
analysis to capture changes in transportation and impacts from an earthquake but may
also provide value in addressing other geographically constrained areas.
The limited range and capabilities of electric transportation are not as significant
to areas where there are many side roads and no major geographic obstacles hinder the
movement of people. However, in an area like the Bay Area, the closure of one or two
bridges or BART or ferry service can drastically increase the mileage needed to travel
between locations (see Figure 1). The high cost of living in the Bay Area leads to
increased reliance on transportation networks because people may live far away from
their workplace. This phenomenon is demonstrated through the rise in workplace
provided shuttles between Silicon Valley and other areas of the Bay Area (Dai &
Weinzimmer, 2014). Additionally, regions constrained by large geographical barriers
such as the San Francisco bay are likely to suffer from limitations of electrified
transportation. Transportation limitations are important because doubling the
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transportation distance can affect whether an electric car can reach a destination without
stoping to recharge. Examining the bridges connecting San Francisco reveals a driving
commute from Berkeley to San Francisco changes from 15 miles to nearly 90 miles
(assuming BART and ferries are out of service). However, with sufficiently high
penetrations of electric vehicles, any widespread electrical disruption could impact an
area.
Because the purpose of the study was to examine how ERPs consider the impacts
of electrification as demonstrated through publicly available documentation, the plans of
individuals who use electric transportation were not considered. Additionally, the
relatively small population, even though drawn from a multientity approach, had a
moderately low level of representation (see Creswell, 2009a). This delimitation was
appropriate because the focus was on publicly available documentation related to
transportation planning.
Limitations
Most research into transportation and disaster response has been focused on gaspowered transportation. ERPs have not started to incorporate the impacts of increasing
reliance on electrification to meet environmental concerns and policy objectives. My
study may not be generalized to areas with readily available alternative transportation
networks—for example, areas like Las Vegas or Phoenix, where geography is not a
substantial limitation for transportation. The focus on only pure-electric transportation,
and the impacts may not be realized in all areas because of the expense of electric
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vehicles and their adoption in certain geographic regions. This creates a narrower study
than if hybrid vehicles were also considered, which may limit the applicability of this
research. Additionally, homeland security laws and regulations can restrict access to
facility specific information or personnel.
Significance
The significance of the study was in understanding what changes to earthquake
disaster management plans for emergency services providers are needed to account for
future changes in transportation. Electrification is potentially a disruptive technology, just
as the advent of the car was disruptive to emerging cities at the turn of the last century.
Unless transportation planning changes to account for the shift to electrification,
community resilience will be threatened.
The implication for positive social change is helping ERPs understand what
planning changes may be necessary as transportation evolves to respond to individuals
affected by a disaster such as an earthquake, thus bolstering community resilience. After
earthquakes in California, a rush of patients to health care providers could occur, even in
an earthquake with impacts that are relatively short-term (Shoaf, Nguyen, Sareen, &
Bourque, 1998). Homeland security and emergency management efforts within public
policy are focused on improving responses to disasters (Jellets, 2008; Litman, 2006;
Longstaff, 2005; Paturas et al., 2010), which can include examining limitations to
transportation. For California, it is only a matter of time before the next big earthquake
strikes and damages the bridges linking various areas to one another.
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Summary
In Chapter 1, I outlined the background, Bay Area policy context, and the terms
for my case study. The Bay Area is vulnerable to large seismic events that can strain both
electrical and transportation infrastructure, impacts that will likely increase because of
California policies to promote electric transportation. Approximately 41 county- and citylevel entities are tasked with planning how to serve the hospitals and trauma centers of
the Bay Area. The response capabilities may be reduced if transportation capabilities are
disrupted. Using a case study approach, I reviewed publicly available documents to
identify any similarities and differences between the planning materials.
In Chapter 2, I describe the literature and key concepts germane to community
resilience, disaster management, and transportation electrification. I also identify the gap
in the literature to justify the study regarding the role of transportation in hospital staffing
after an earthquake. In Chapter 3, I describe the methodological approach of a case study,
including the sample and selection methodology, as well as storage, organization, coding,
and analysis of the data. In Chapter 4, I describe the results of the case study and
document review, including demographics, data collection and analysis, and evidence of
trustworthiness. In Chapter 5, I discuss and interpret the findings, review the limitations
that arose from the study, provide recommendation for further research, and discuss
implication for social change.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Transportation electrification is increasing across the United States, but
consideration of the electrification trend among the disaster planning, health care, and
transportation sectors is still lacking. The purpose of this study was to understand the
impacts of transportation electrification on emergency response planning resulting from
hospital staff/administration and potential patients using electric transportation. My study
was focused on the impacts to health care personnel and injured people arriving in Bay
Area hospitals. I used document reviews to assess qualitatively how the present and
expected future use of electric vehicles will pose a problem after an earthquake and what
planning needs to occur. In Chapter 2, I describe my literature search strategy, the
theoretical foundation, and key concepts before closing with a summary.
The literature since the end of the first decade of the century, as compared to the
earlier or seminal literature, has been more focused on establishing frameworks within
specific areas of community resilience. Earlier literature has established the broad
frameworks, such as adaptive management or community resilience. However,
transportation has played a critical role in the provision of health care, and health care is
an important part of community resilience. The theoretical foundation for this study was
based on work conducted first by Holling (1973) and more recently by Norris et al.
(2007). Community resilience theory was selected because of the interactive nature and
focus on finding the gaps in how communities respond after disasters. Community
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resilience provided a lens for simplifying the complexity inherent in systems to allow
further study. Community resilience also provides the foundation under which
transportation electrification can be examined, both before and after a disturbance.
Literature Search Strategy
I used digital databases for the literature search as well as the websites for the
Association of Bay Area Governments, SPUR, and the University of California
Transportation Center. For the digital databases, I conducted searches in Google Scholar,
Political Science Complete, SAGE’s Political Science Collection, ABI/INFORM
Complete, the IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Science Direct, the Homeland Security
Digital Library, and PubMed. The search, to the extent possible, was limited to peerreviewed articles and to dissertations. Key search terms were community resilience,
resilience, community resilience and transportation, resilience and transportation,
resilience and transportation and electricity, earthquake and electric vehicle, and lifeline
transportation. Major articles cited by 20 or more sources were the focus of my first
search on community resilience. My second search was time-restricted to articles
published since 2010. I examined the University of California Transportation Center’s
faculty research paper and policy brief websites going back to 2008, and dissertations
going back to 2005. I searched SPUR’s website for resilience, electric, and vehicle.
Lastly, I searched the Association of Bay Area Government’s website for resilience,
electric, vehicle and also reviewed the electric vehicle readiness page. For reference to
the methodological approach, as I discuss in Chapter 3, I read prominent texts on
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qualitative research from Anderson (2005), Patton (2002), Stebbins (2001), and Yin
(2014).
Despite the expansiveness of the literature review search, I discovered little to no
research about resilience and electric transportation. Therefore, I conducted additional
searches on security and electric vehicle. These searches revealed articles on enhancing
electrical grid reliability by using electric vehicles as a form of distributed generation,
and on securing communications about the car’s energy use. A search for resilience and
electric vehicle or electric transport delivered similar results.
Theoretical Foundation
Community Resilience
Community resilience formed the core theory for the present study. Community
resilience draws on engineering and ecology, combining both resilience and community
to understand how different forces interact with the human system. Norris et al. (2007)
applied community resilience to disaster management and outlined community resilience
as a theory, a metaphor, capacities, and a strategy. Though the term community has many
broad definitions, in the context of resilience, community is the structure of a group of
people who are bound together by critical linkages of individuals or geographic areas
(Adger, 2000; Norris et al., 2007). All communities are not equal, and different parts of a
community will be more or less advantaged with resilience and resistance capabilities
(Adger, 2000). It is also important to consider differences in resistance capabilities within
subpopulations when assessing resilience (Cutter et al., 2008). Therefore, community is
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defined in the study as the structure of a group of people, including subpopulations,
delineated by the group’s linkages of either geography or between individuals.
Resilience, in contrast to community, draws on both physical and environmental
sciences. As early as 1973, Holling applied resilience in the ecological context, though in
1676 the engineering concept of resilience was initially described by Robert Hooke
(Leveson et al., 2006). In either context, resilience can be defined as how quickly a
system can return to its previous state after disruption. Norris et al. (2007) described
resilience as the capability to adapt to changes and that resilience is a capability, not an
outcome, as well as “a process linking a set of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory
of functioning and adaptation after a disturbance” (p. 130). The restoration point differs
between the engineering and ecological constructs.
In engineering, resilience can be either a return to the previous state or to a new
stable state after a disruption (Leveson et al., 2006). In the ecological sense, resilience is
not linked to stability but instead to overall system function for which there may be
negative outcomes (Adger, 2000). Linking both the engineering and ecological realms,
Bruneau et al. (2003) defined resilience as social units mitigating hazards, containing
them, and then recovering while also working to lessen future impacts (p. 735). This link
between engineering and social aspects are important because resilience, from the
community resilience perspective, relates both to the physical resilience of the
infrastructures relied on as well as the resilience of the people impacted by a crisis. Given

30
localization and mobility, discussed later, both elements are critical for recovery from a
crisis.
Major premise. The major premise of community resilience is that a crisis will
lead to one of three results: (a) resistance, (b) resilience, or (c) vulnerability (Norris et al.,
2007). Resistance is the best result to a crisis because no disruption occurs (Longstaff,
2005; Longstaff & Yang, 2008). In other words, the community has sufficiently strong
resources and infrastructure that the disaster did not significantly impact. Resilience, on
the other hand, is a changed end-state after a “surprise” event (Adger, 2000; Longstaff &
Yang, 2008; Norris et al., 2007). With many alternatives available, such as alternative
means of transportation, resilience may come quickly and may lead to a permanent
change in the structure of a community or its infrastructure.
Alternatively, resilience could lead to a change in pattern or structure, such as
relocating services or a more permanent shift in transportation patterns. Vulnerability is
an undesired outcome because the system is worse-off after the surprise and is on a
downward trajectory (Cutter et al., 2003). Social vulnerability, according to Adger
(2000), “is the exposure of groups of people or individuals to stress as a result of the
impacts of environmental change” (p. 348). For example, a disaster may leave parts of a
community uninhabitable such as occurred after the Christchurch, New Zealand
earthquakes in 2010 and 2011, which revealed unknown vulnerabilities in geology and
construction (Cubrinovski et al., 2011). Accordingly, it is also important to examine the
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ecological roots of resilience and how the natural environment plays into community
resilience.
Resilience. Resilience is tied into environmental and ecological factors. Under
cases of extreme environmental factors, such as a disaster, migration of people can occur
as a symptom of broken resilience (Adger, 2000). For example, examination of migration
back to areas affected by Hurricane Katrina revealed statistically significant results based
on “location-specific capital,” an individual measure of ties to a community such as time
lived in the community and family in that area (Groen & Polivka, 2010, p. 823). The
linkages on the infrastructure end were less clear because restoration of services may
have been a factor in migrants returning or a result of demand from migrants returning.
At the junction of community resilience and ecology is sustainability (Tobin,
1999). Social, economic, demographic, and climate change factors all pose challenges to
the overall sustainability of a community (Cutter et al., 2008; Tobin, 1999). For example,
Tobin (1999) studied Florida’s response to disasters through the sustainability lens and
found a conflict between hazard planning, environmental issues, and maintaining
communities after disasters. Furthermore, policy to support social, economic, and
demographic considerations may be misaligned with disaster knowledge, which may be
partially caused by a lack of full autonomy (Magis, 2010) because many modern
communities are linked to each other; therefore, what occurs in one community will
impact another community. As an example, a community that does not improve bridge
infrastructure may have a detrimental impact on all communities linked by that bridge if
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the bridge fails. The most resilient communities are those that feel the most empowered
to guide their own fate as long as they are aware of the challenges they may face in the
future (Magis, 2010). Additionally, at the core of community resilience is the ability to
change and adapt, as suggested by Adger (2000), Magis, and Norris et al. (2007). Lastly,
adaptation and resilience are further driven by specialization, which decreases resilience,
and localization, which strengthens resilience (Adger, 2000).
Homeland security and emergency management. Resilience is an important
concept to homeland security and emergency management, especially in understanding
how disruptions are resolved (Department of Homeland Security, 2010). The best
approaches to assessing the impact to communities have been under examination,
particularly since Hurricane Katrina, but there is no consensus yet. For example, adaptive
management has been used to address system restoration after a human disaster or a
terrorist attack (Whicker et al., 2008), which is still applicable to other disasters such as
an earthquake because the same issues of resistance, resilience, or vulnerability exist.
Adaptive management has been determined as the best model for success using Hurricane
Katrina as a case study (Wise, 2006), which includes both the ecological and human
resilience as appropriate views in examining disaster responses (Gunderson, 2010).
However, Engle (2011) directly assessed adaptive management outside of the ecological
context, and separately from resilience, summarizing the problem as “adaptive capacity is
a relatively under-researched topic within the sustainability science and global change
communities, particularly since it is uniquely positioned to improve linkages between

33
vulnerability and resilience research” (p. 647). Engle’s sentiment was echoed by Berkes
and Ross (2013), who also found the strong history of adaptive management in ecology
but only within the last 15 years for localities and communities.
With sufficient forecast increases in electrical vehicle use, community resilience
theory indicates that agencies should begin planning in order to be prepared for this shift
in technology. In this sense, this study was designed to confirm either the occurrence of
resilience or resistance or confirm the need to consider what other steps, such as
robustness, redundancy, or rapidity of restoration need to be considered in establishing
the capacity to deal with an earthquake. For example, the “Ready, Set, Charge,
California” guidance document put together by Bay Area government, planning, and
environmental advocacy groups does not include a single section on earthquake or
disaster response, instead focusing on how to grow electric vehicle penetrations through
electric rate design, Americans with Disabilities Act compliance, signage, and other such
matters (Association of Bay Area Governments, Bay Area Climate Collaborative, Clean
Fuel Connection, EV Communities Alliance, & LightMoves Consulting, 2011).
Literature Review of Key Concepts / Variables
As established in the National Health Security Strategy for the United States,
transportation provides a key component for the provision of health services (Department
of Health and Human Services, 2009). Health services in turn affect the health and
resilience of a community. Broadly speaking, Bruneau et al. (2003) were amongst the
first to describe and document the resilience equation and graph from a community
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resilience perspective. Qualitatively, a system begins in a stable state, is then disrupted
leading to lower services, and then returns to some point of stability.
Most studies conducted to date have focused on broad generalizations of
community resilience at a conceptual level rather than attempts to quantify the impacts or
level of resilience. More current research, such as that conducted by Hick et al. (2013),
Syed et al. (2013), and Hess, McDowell, and Luber (2011), has changed to incorporate
quantification of resilience, rather than addressing resilience from a conceptual level.
These authors focused on the present infrastructure state, not the future infrastructure
state. However, compared to earlier studies, those three studies advanced community
resilience assessments by narrowing down the examination to a specific area. These
studies are consistent with the underlying Bruneau et al. (2003) approach and
methodology, and the current study continued that trend. As part of the infrastructure
impacting community resilience, emergency response and the ability to provide it plays
an important role (Norris et al., 2007).
Infrastructure
Extending from Von Lubitz, Beakley, and Patricelli’s (2008) all-hazards approach
is the critical recognition of the importance in maintaining medical and water services as
part of a community’s resources. Hospital, electrical systems, and local emergency
management were three of their five key areas for assessing community resilience.
Morton and Lurie (2013) indicated that physical infrastructure needs to be combined with
social capital for truly resilient communities to emerge, whereas Zhong et al. (2014)
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observed the sparsity of good methods for assessing resilience in hospitals. Coming a few
years ahead of Morton and Lurie (2013), Hess, McDowell et al. (2011) examined the
health care sector finding that only environmental health was significantly covered, but
not the impacts of petroleum shortages on transportation. Hess, McDowell et al. then
assessed the impacts of petroleum shortages and found moderate short-term
vulnerabilities, particularly for transportation, but expected larger vulnerabilities under
long-term shortages. Similarly, Syed et al. (2013) found that transportation barriers were
a significant barrier to health care access, even without the stress of a disaster on the
system, and found that further research was needed on how much transportation limits
health care access. Paturas et al. (2010) cautioned that during a major disaster, hospital
staff absenteeism can exceed half of staff. Reliance upon electrified transportation could
further increase absenteeism.
The approach of Syed et al. (2013), wherein transportation barriers to long-term
health care were assessed, is most similar to this study. Syed et al. conducted searched
peer-reviewed studies based on needs for ongoing health care given transportation
barriers in the United States. The result was a 48-study matrix listing the author,
population, methods, measure of transportation barriers, and results of the study.
Importantly, the review discovered mixed evidence for distance from care and receiving
the care; six studies found distance as a barrier, two found no difference, and one found a
benefit from increased distance (p. 987). The approach undertaken, focusing on long-term
and primary conditions, was one limitation, as it did not focus on acute conditions that
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may arise out of a disaster, as was another limitation assuming normal transportation
conditions rather than disrupted conditions that may occur after a disaster. Many of the
studies reviewed were also cross-sectional, limiting the ability of the authors to make
strong conclusions. According to Mann (2003), cross-sectional designs are useful for
discovering prevalence of a problem and identifying associations, but are weak in
determining cause and effect. However, Syed et al. highlighted a key distinction:
subjective questions indicated that distance was a burden, but objective measurement
found distance to not be a barrier. In short, the type of transportation has a greater impact
than distance travelled. Using a bus to travel ten miles is a much different proposition
than using a car to travel the same distance. Cimellaro et al. (2011) identified several
different calculations for assessing the impact of bridge closures, assuming there is an
alternate path. In the Bay Area, there are alternate paths, but they can radically increase
travel distance and time.
Hick et al. (2013), for example, focused on different definitions of hospital surge
capacity needs, but still emphasized that they were establishing a framework for
consideration of needs. Hick et al. approached the problem as a lack of good frameworks
for establishing hospital response capabilities after a disaster. In their approach, Hick et
al. started by critiquing the current approach and then proposed their own method based
on certain definitions and broad approaches for categorizing surge capacity. The
weakness to the Hick et al. approach is that although their components in responding are
well documented, the three subsets of response are what they are developing. Without
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some case study, or a further step in analyzing the underlying capabilities, the authors
were forced to rely upon sample calculations and the appropriateness or consensus within
the field for their underlying model cannot be ascertained. In their conclusion, taxonomy
and standardized data are both raised as areas for next steps, but not confirmation of their
proposed approach.
Transportation. The Bay Area has evolved into a linked network with San
Francisco as the central hub from the outlying counties (Mieler & Brechwald, 2013;
SPUR, 2010). The Bay Area linked network is subject to several potential transportation
bottlenecks: the Transbay Tube (used by BART), the Bay Bridge, the Richmond Bridge,
the Golden Gate Bridge, the San Mateo Bridge, and the Dumbarton Bridge. There is also
limited ferry capacity, which can currently carry only 2,000 people an hour (Metcalf &
Amin, 2013). The Transbay Tube (connecting the East Bay with San Francisco) had
212,000 commuters on average in 2013, with average daily ridership across the system at
over 350,000 (BART, 2013). Although natural disasters such as the 1989 Loma Prieta
earthquake and man-made problems like the BART strikes in 2013 have created solid
data around transportation infrastructure disruptions, SPUR (2013) identified the need for
land use and planning data to be able to better plan and react to disasters including
“identifying failed infrastructure and its consequences” such as roads, bridges, and
electrical infrastructure (p. 61). These studies demonstrate the Bay Area is a linked
network that is vulnerable to transportation disruptions from a variety of causes including
earthquakes.
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Dorbritz (2011) used simulation tools to assess the resilience of the Swiss
railways and tram networks running through Zurich. The focal point of the study was to
assess the resilience of the transportation network to disruption after a disaster. One key
set of infrastructure impacting the rail network was the status of energy subsystems.
Scale-free networks are comprised of linked nodes that are highly susceptible to
disruption if a few key nodes are disrupted (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Zhao, Park, Lai,
& Ye, 2005). In the transportation context, the Bay Bridge (or the Transbay Tube) would
be a key node connecting San Francisco with the East Bay. Many roads lead into the Bay
Bridge on both sides of the San Francisco Bay, but the entire network begins to collapse
if the Bay Bridge is not in service.
Hobson and Quiroz-Martínez (2002) and Syed et al. (2013), advocated for asking
both subjective and objective questions when asking questions about transportation. In
their study, Hess, Bednarz, et al. (2011b) the independent variable was imported crude oil
prices (reflecting potential shortages in the market), and the dependent variable was the
consumer product index inflation for medical care. The authors found a modest link
between these two variables. Procyk and Dhariwal (2010) examined both earthquakes
and floods and their potential impacts on transportation. However, whereas Procyk and
Dhariwal’s study was conceptual, they did illustrate the dependency of transportation and
the provision of health care on electricity. Procyk and Dhariwal focused on road and rail
damage, whereas Eidinger and Kempner (2012) identified electrical transmission as
another weakness in earthquake situations. However, the broader linkage between
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electricity and cars has focused primarily upon broad benefits in early studies like Deakin
and Kim (2001), and more recently on narrow benefits such as greenhouse gas reductions
like Deakin (2011). Therefore, although the literature has linked electrified transportation
with ecological goals, it has not addressed the implications of the ecological goals, such
as the shift from petroleum, and how that affects resilience. In turn the lack of linkages
presents challenges for earthquake planning and homeland security because the negative
consequences are not currently being assessed for transportation electrification.
Distance from health care. Distance and time play an important role for
receiving medical services, particularly in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Hobson and
Quiroz-Martinez (2002) undertook a convenience-based sample and conducted
Geographical Information System analysis based on that sample. Hobson and QuirozMartinez’s found that 67% of residents needed to travel 30 minutes, or a half-mile walk
or more, to reach a hospital. Although doctors and nurses are unlikely to fall within the
disadvantaged category, Hobson and Quiroz-Martinez’s study provides several important
for this study, for example, how the respondents travel to work, number of cars owned, if
they use public transit, and what problems are experienced on public transit. Different
data sets including transit route data, population data, and health facility data were
overlaid in Hobson and Quiroz-Martinez’s study to examine problems, such as closing a
regional hospital and its effect on health care access. For purposes of the present study,
the weakness of Hobson and Quiroz-Martinez’s study was the focus on disadvantaged
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communities, and as noted in the study, the problem with consistent responses and
interpretations of survey questions.
Hess, Bednarz, et al. (2011) approached petroleum shortages from several angles,
including Graphical Information System (GIS) assessment of distances traveled by health
care workers to their workplace. The strength of the Hess, Bednarz, et al. approach was
their broad examination of how the entire petroleum industry impacts health care
provision. The major weakness, despite several types of case studies was that none of the
analysis and documentation dove deeply into the what and how elements of their
research. Yet Hess, Bednarz, et al. addressed current literature examining similar
variables and problems considered in the present study.
Transportation range and uptake. Vehicle uptake and range varies greatly by
technology type. Recker and King (2010) used recorded data and found that most vehicle
users traveled fewer than 20 miles a day. Manufacturers are building electric vehicles
with ranges as low as 20 and over 500 miles per charge. Regarding vehicle uptake,
Hidrue, Parsons, Kempton, and Gardner (2011) found that more affluent individuals were
more likely to be consumers of electric vehicles, and the University of California San
Francisco (2010) is increasing infrastructure to support electric vehicles. Similarly, the
California Energy Commission (2012) forecasted more than 3.5 million electric vehicles
in California by 2020.
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Transportation Modeling
Although not their focus, Hess, Bednarz, et al. (2011) examine how far hospital
staff lived from their place of work using ArcGIS and the collection of work and home
zip code data. In Atlanta, that the average staff member traveled approximately 14 miles
each way. Hess, Bednarz, et al. presented the most comprehensive quantitative
assessment of transportation and potential impacts on health care out of those located and
reviewed during the literature search. In contrast, Sisiopiku (2007) used the Corridor
Simulation (CORSIM) model, but used a case study approach to examine an emergency
report. The primary result was a finding of the need to test an approach to see what
impacts or improvements were needed and an acknowledgement of regional planning
tools beyond CORSIM’s capabilities. As a third type of transportation model, Naghawi
and Wolshon (2010) used the Transportation Analysis Simulation System (TRANSIMS)
to study evacuation routes in New Orleans. Naghawi and Wolshon used a similar process
to Sisiopiku, involving the collection of transit plan data, alternatives, and then
comparing scenarios. Murray-Tuite (2006)’s fourth model, Dynamic Network
Assignment-Simulation Model for Advanced Roadway Telematics, Planning Version
(DYNASMART-P), used a suite of variables, including evacuation time, response
vehicle travel time between zones, line length, average line length, average speeds versus
modeled speeds on a given transportation system, and the volume over capacity for a
given transportation system. Notably, Murray-Tuite indicated that results from any
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transportation simulation will be limited to the area studied and are not typically
generalizable.
Summary and Conclusions
The literature is scant in regard to transportation resilience in the event of an
earthquake or other disaster. Through the literature review I identified a need for further
study to develop variables, particularly for time and resilience after an earthquake. More
studies have been conducted around transportation modeling, using a variety of planning
tools. Most notably, Wells et al. (2013) stated “there are no operational models of how to
build [community resilience]” (p. 1172). The lack of operational models is confirmed by
other works coming after the National Heath Security Strategy, such as Chandra et al.
(2010), who mentioned evacuation as a core component for health security, but not the
capability to bring health care workers to the scene.
Two main themes surfaced in the literature. First, community resilience is a
relatively new field, having arisen out of adaptive management in the mid-1990s; second,
community resilience has been recently moving from generalizations into more
specialized areas. However, a robust quantitative method is still lacking to determine
resilience. What is known is that community resilience provides a broad framework for
assessing what happens pre- and post- disaster. Community resilience is an area
increasingly under examination across multiple fields. Researchers from across
disciplines, ranging from medical practitioners to land-use and disaster specialists, are
examining how to implement community resilience. These studies have explored what
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community resilience is, and how transportation impacts community resilience. What
these studies have not done is focus on the role electric transportation has in the
transportation-community resilience-disaster nexus.
This study filled a gap in the existing literature by incorporating electric
transportation into a new framework that examines what electrification may mean for
future community resilience assessments. The present study built upon work by Hick et
al. (2013) and Syed et al. (2013), but with a targeted focus on transporting the health care
workers who are needed to meet the surge response. Through a case study approach, by
analyzing documents on planning, I identified themes about the state of current
preparedness and consideration for electric transportation. Accordingly, the present study
extended knowledge in the discipline by beginning to incorporate the ongoing trend of
transportation electrification into the area of community resilience. In Chapter 3, I will
present the methodological approach, a qualitative case study consisting of document
review of emergency plans.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this qualitative study my purpose was to assess the impacts of transportation
electrification on emergency response planning through a case study examination of Bay
Area emergency planning, public health, and transportation entity documentation. By
exploring and comparing the planning documents, my intent was to understand what
differences in planning for electrified transportation exist in how ERPs conduct their
planning, how the plans are formed, and if electrified transportation was considered in the
plans (Creswell, 2009b). In Chapter 3, I present the detailed research design and rationale
based on the three research questions. In Chapter 3, I also discuss the methodology,
including participant selection logic, instrumentation, data collection, data analysis,
trustworthiness, and ethical procedures.
Research Design and Rationale
The following questions guided this research:
Research Question 1: From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response
planners, as demonstrated through public documents, what key factors, if any, do they
take into account when considering transportation needs of staff/administration reporting
to work after an earthquake?
Research Question 2: From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response
planners, as demonstrated through public documents, what are the key factors that they
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take into account when considering transportation needs of individuals needing assistance
after an earthquake?
Research Question 3: What are the differences in the emergency response plans
for electric transportation between cities and counties in the Bay Area?
The central concept of my collective case study was to examine if and how ERPs
and emergency plans currently consider electrified transportation in their planning and
how they may include it in the future. In particular, I reviewed public documentation to
see if there is a level of electrification that needs to occur before ERPs start including it in
their planning assessments, if the ERPs are not already doing so. Additionally, I
examined what roles transportation takes in emergency plans and planning in the
staffing/administration in Bay Area hospitals, and for victims, after an earthquake. I
limited the research to the Bay Area county and city emergency planning, public health,
and transportation entities. The Bay Area covers a diverse geographical area and types of
governance area, helping to provide greater breadth to the study.
I selected a collective case study approach because studying what is currently
done in a given setting is appropriate for a case study (see Yin, 2014), and I examined
emergency planning in the bounds of the Bay Area. Because the literature review shows
that transportation electrification’s impact on emergency planning has had little
exploration to date, an inductive approach such as a case study was appropriate (Stebbins,
2001). As part of my methodological consideration I also considered ethnography, field
research, phenomenology, and grounded theory approaches, and rejected each. Because
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the research questions do not guide the research toward generation of a theory, grounded
theory was not appropriate (Cohen, 1969; Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Although the end
goal of the study was to understand how ERPS perceive electric transportation, the
research questions were not designed to gain understanding of how the world is viewed
by others, so phenomenology was not chosen. Additionally, an ethnography was not
appropriate because the study was not limited to understanding a single culture or
organization, although ERPs in the hospital setting potentially share many similar
elements (see Creswell, 2009a).
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, I selected and reviewed the documents, interpreted the
materials in the documents, reviewed plans, and analyzed the collective results to
understand what role transportation electrification has or may have for emergency
planning. To serve in this role, I reviewed electronic or hard copies of the planning
documents. To my knowledge, I had no professional relationships with any of the ERPs
or any of the counties or cities in a transportation or emergency planning function.
Because the documents I reviewed were public, I had no concerns about confidentiality
or informed consent. To my knowledge, I had no other ethical concerns in this research.
My current employment focuses on the natural gas sector, on wildfires, and other issues
impacting electric infrastructure but not earthquakes. The primary bias I was aware of
was my expectation that ERPs and emergency plans are not considering transportation
electrification and reliance on electrical systems. Through reviewing written plans and
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documents, I was able to use bracketing to address any biases that I potentially became
aware of during the research.
Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
I selected the Bay Area because of its geography and the high prevalence and use
of electric transportation in the region. My study represented separate emergency, public
health, and transportation departments in all nine counties in the Bay Area, and 16 out of
85 cities in the Bay Area. Many of the cities in the Bay Area do not have their own
departments of public health and transportation, which are instead handled at the county
level. The number of departments examined allowed some latitude in case some entities
do not have information publicly available. Yin (2014) indicated that validity grows for a
qualitative study as the number of experiences examined increases. Orne and Bell (2015)
described this type of sampling as theoretical sampling, or based off of gathering a full
range of diversity. Given the geographical spread of the counties and cities selected, I
attained a range of diversity by including these facilities in the study.
To collect the data, I reviewed the publicly available documents for each
department on their websites and then collected public but not online documents as I
come across them for the entity that has the information. Because this information was
public, I needed no freedom of information requests and had no significant problems
collecting the data. I reviewed the emergency plans and coded them for terms and themes
as discussed later in this chapter.
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Instrumentation
I used one set of instrumentation, written plans and documents, and in particular
the portions of those plans involving emergencies and transportation. I had no reason to
suspect that documents would not be reputable, as they are primary documents in the
public domain and the best source of data based on my research questions.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Data were collected from the websites of the entities I examined. In-office visits
were not necessary. Document review of the plans took between 2 to 3 hours each. As I
was able to attain data saturation, I did not need to expand the scope beyond the Bay Area
to other neighboring regions, such as the Central Coast or San Joaquin Valley.
Data Analysis Plan
The data connected to all three questions, although Question 3 was based on the
interpolation of the data collected. In order to code responses to questions, I used topic,
conceptual, and analytic coding. For topical coding, my primary interest was in types of
transportation or fuel types, for staff and for individuals needing assistance, that are
brought up in the documents. Question 1 addressed the staff/administrative aspect of
transportation, and Question 2 addressed individuals needing assistance. Rubin and Rubin
(2012) explained that topical markers are usually self-evident, and I this was true as I
analyzed the data collected from the documents. Conceptual terms included terminology
like transportation or electricity, which are more generic but capture themes I expected to
arise during the review. Lastly, Richards (2015) described analytic coding as coding

49
based on interpretation and reflection. This type of coding requires detailed
understanding of the collected data in order to reveal meanings and was of particular use
in answering Question 3.
Coding the data was done using NVivo analytical software. NVivo is an iterative
tool that helps identify themes across data types by importing data, coding the data,
querying the data, interpreting it, finding common themes, and then writing the results of
the query. In this coding process, outliers were revealed. Outliers play an important role
in qualitative research, and I included notable examples in the results of the study.
Barbour (2001) recommended qualitative research include outliers in order to help
provide juxtaposition. I used to compare cods across data entries, such as documents
collected from different departments of transportation, to see if there were differences,
discrepancies, or a need to consolidate similar coding into a common platform.
I used the NVivo software platform to conduct analysis of the data for the written
documents. Richards (2015) cautioned that software packages can be problematic for
qualitative researchers because rich data can be coded in unwieldy detail and depth,
possibly preventing completion of the study. In order to counter this, Richards
recommended focusing on the researcher’s interest in the data rather than blindly coding
the data (2015). A full and rich set of data helps establish trustworthiness of the data.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness for qualitative research reflects credibility, transferability,
dependability, confirmability, and coding reliability (Patton, 2015). Each of these factors
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is analogous to internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity in a
quantitative study. In order to establish credibility, Patton listed four related elements:
systematic fieldwork, conscientious data analysis, researcher reliability, and belief in the
value of qualitative inquiry. The first step to maintaining credibility was to seek out data
supporting alternative positions than those I may have believed in. Patton described that
the data support this when a researcher can find the “best fit, the preponderance of
evidence” (2015, p. 654). The process of coding the data allowed me to review to see if
any outliers were in fact errors (Shenton, 2004).
By reviewing planning documents at different entities, such as between
transportation and public health, and for cities versus counties, I was able to attain data
saturation. Transferability, or external validity, was attained through my reaching out to
multiple entities, across the Bay Area region, in order to account for local differences,
demographics, and geography, all of which should provide the data set with variation in
types and levels of governance, geography, and demographics. Although the research
questions were driven by an area with geographical constraints that more strongly impact
transportation with limited ranges, other areas in the United States and elsewhere would
have similar limitations, such as New York City.
Dependability was demonstrated through keeping notes as I reviewed and coded
data, and through provision of details in the results section regarding the detail of how
documents were gathered and obtained. I also noted the dates and revision numbers of
emergency plans in case they changed over time or if conflicting documents emerged.
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During the course of the study I remembered to reflect frequently on the entities and
locations I was reviewing, changed them as necessary, and documented the changes and
why I undertook them. There was also an overlap between the different types of
documents within a governmental entity, such as city, and with entities of similar types
such as departments of transportation in neighboring counties, a process which Shenton
(2004) referred to as “overlapping methods” (p. 71).
Similar to dependability, confirmability was demonstrated through triangulation
of information. To this end, earlier in this chapter I discussed my own biases and
background. I logged my decisions and choices so another observer could follow the path
and course undertaken during my document review.
Ethical Procedures
Because the documents I reviewed were public, there were no ethical concerns
with human participants. None of the documents I collected required me to contact staff.
All data were stored on an USB drive and on a hard drive on my personal computer. No
other ethical issues applied.
Summary
In my case study I examined and explored the perceptions and concerns of ERPs
from nine Bay Area counties and 15 cities about electrification of transportation, and the
implications during and after an earthquake. This occurred through the review of existing
public documents from emergency planning, health care, and transportation departments
at these governmental entities. In Chapter 3, I presented the methodological approach I
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undertook for my study. In Chapter 4 I will present the results of the study undertaken to
examine the three research questions including the setting, demographics, data collection,
data analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, and results.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to assess the impacts resulting from
hospital staff, hospital administrators, and injured people using electric transportation
through a case study of emergency planning, public health, and transportation entities in
the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area Region. I explored three research questions:
Research Question 1: From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response
planners, as demonstrated through public documents, what key factors, if any, do they
take into account when considering transportation needs of staff/administration reporting
to work after an earthquake?
Research Question 2: From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response
planners, as demonstrated through public documents, what are the key factors that they
take into account when considering transportation needs of individuals needing assistance
after an earthquake?
Research Question 3: What are the differences in the emergency response plans
for electric transportation between cities and counties in the Bay Area?
The chapter is organized into the following sections: Setting, Demographics, Data
Collection, Data Analysis, Evidence of Trustworthiness, Results, and a Summary.
Setting
The research setting was my home office. I reviewed the ERP documents over
several months. Where plans were written before January 1, 2017, I searched the
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appropriate websites or other sources after I had reviewed and analyzed all documents to
see if there had been an update. In October 2017, wildfires caused extensive damage in
Sonoma and Napa counties (Krishnakumar, Fox, & Keller, 2017). Both counties have
dedicated websites to postdisaster recovery as of May 12, 2018. The recovery efforts may
have resulted either in delays to planned document updates or encouraged resource
planners to update their documents, even though wildfires are outside of this study’s
scope on earthquake-related factors.

Figure 6. Dark dots represent locations of the fires whereas lines indicate major
roadways, by Phoenix7777, 2017. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0.
Demographics
The scope of the research was the nine Bay Area counties and a selection of 16
cities out of the 85 in the nine counties. The research included statewide and federal
planning documents when either a county-level or city-level document referenced the
statewide or federal planning processes. The statewide entities included via reference
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were the California Department of Public Health, California Office of Emergency
Services, California Hospital Association, and the Great California Shakeout. The U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Preparedness and Response, was the federal-level entity referenced by local and county
documents. Including state and federal documents expanded the original data collection
scope. This additional scope resulted in the addition of additional publicly available
documents.
Data Collection
My data collection resulted in a review of 63 websites and documents and
analysis and coding of 48 website documents. The information was imported into NVivo
software for analysis. Some websites were not imported when they clearly did not
involve electrified transportation—for example, hospital surgery and triage procedures
for disasters. Each webpage was searched for direct documents, such as emergency
operations plans, for links to direct documents, or for directly usable information
regarding city or county plans. In this latter case, the webpages were converted into
Adobe pdf files and imported into NVivo for analysis.
Each document was reviewed for the terms fuel, transportation, electri,
alternative, emergency, disaster, and critical infrastructure. The term electri was used to
capture different terms reflecting considerations regarding electric infrastructure,
particularly electrification, electric, and electricity. These search terms also helped ensure
that the documents had transferred correctly into NVivo for analysis.
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Once I had retrieved the documents, they were reviewed and imported into
NVivo. With the exception of converting webpage analysis via pdf, and the use of
Microsoft Excel to analyze the date of the documents, the data collection plan from
Chapter 3 was followed for the documents. In two cases, documents could not be reliably
uploaded into NVivo, so I reviewed the documents externally, and I imported summary
notes and quotations into NVivo for coding and analysis. In total, 48 documents were
analyzed in NVivo. Nine documents had both fuel and transportation coded, indicating
an overlap between the document containing information that I coded as relevant to
transportation and postdisaster impacts as well as including the term fuel. Thirteen
documents contained the term fuel but were not coded for transportation, and 12
documents were coded for transportation but did not include the term fuel. More
information on my coding methodology is discussed in the data analysis.
Data Analysis
I first reviewed each of the 48 documents to identify the sections pertaining to
transportation and emergency planning and response. After identifying these sections, I
then performed the key term review to ascertain whether I had missed any other areas
involving transportation, such as fuel, alternative fuel vehicles, emergency, and electricrelated activities. Each of these key terms was evaluated and identified, and then
consolidated into the fuel theme. Fuel was included in the analysis after the first several
documents were coded, and fuel was identified as an emergent theme for postdisaster
logistics.
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Fuel was coded when it was in a document. This was regardless of the use as a
fuel for a vehicle, or a generator, or other power system. I included fuel in this manner, as
a power generator that uses fuel can power an electric vehicle. I also included fuel as a
forward-looking term because electricity is comparable to gasoline or diesel as a fuel for
transportation. Fuel was identified in 22 of the documents after searching for the term in
each document. The Bay Area Urban Areas Security Initiative (2017) identified “within
the first 24 to 48 hours of an incident, the County OES [Office of Emergency Services]
has processes and procedures in place to prioritize fuel needs and distribution among
critical infrastructure (e.g., hospitals and gas stations) and responders (e.g., public safety
and utility crews)” (p. 59). The Alameda County Transportation Commission (2016)
identified increased fuel economy and electric vehicles as an environmental benefit but
not within the context of emergency use. California Public Health and Medical
Emergency Operations Manual (2011) included the term fuel as part of overall logistics
35 times. As I continued to review documents, nodes that I had originally thought were
independent were consolidated into themes, such as combining alternative vehicles into
the fuel node. The overall frequency of fuel coding is identified in Figure 7.

Number of Documents Reviewed That
Focus on Critical Role of Fuel
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Figure 7. Frequency of fuel coding in reviewed EPR documents.
The second emergent theme was transportation. Transportation was coded in 21
of the documents reviewed. In contrast to my coding of fuel, I only coded transportation
when it was paired with disasters, emergency management, and hospitals. This narrowed
scope was due to the transportation commission documents and other planning agencies
including many factors unrelated to disasters or emergencies. After reviewing the results
and examining some of the documents again, I also coded transportation when a
document included electrical impacts, such as a loss of electricity as a transportation
impact.
The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (2008) identified electrical power
loss as impacting transportation. The Department of Health and Human Services (2016)
identified transportation as critical infrastructure for healthcare but did not identify fuel
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under the transportation section. The City of San Jose (2004) Emergency Operations Plan
included in 2004 that “the transportation system needed to take the person elsewhere” in
areas impacted by the loss of power in the section on interdependencies (p. P-4). The City
of San Jose, however, does not go further in addressing how the risk and application of
electrical interdependency planning should occur. Other documents, such as the
Metropolitan Transportation Commission (2018) referenced the challenges of reducing
greenhouse gasses but not the potential reductions in community resilience from shifting
transportation fuel sources. The number of coded references to transportation by
document is in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Frequency of transportation coding in reviewed EPR documents.
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Microsoft Excel was used to analyze the date of the documents and perform
graphic analysis of the data. For documents without a date, I counted them as having a
(n.d.) entry for no date. Twenty-seven percent of the documents had no date, and 73%
had a date. Eighty percent of the documents with a date had been updated in 2012 or
more recently, or 58% when counting documents without a date as occurring prior to
2012. This indicates that many of the documents have been updated in the time frame
where electric transportation and policy objectives to increase electric transportation in
the Bay Area and California were identified by the California Energy Commission
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(2012). Figure 9 shows the number of reviewed documents and their year.

Year of Update

Figure 9. Number of documents reviewed, counted by date of update.
In particular, the comparison of the document date with the California Energy
Commission’s (2012) identification of electric vehicle targets in 2012, helps provide
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evidence of trustworthiness, as it demonstrates that policy objectives for electrification
existed as early as 2012.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility was established by obtaining and analyzing documents from a broad
set of local, county, state, and federal documents. Although initial examination indicated
electric transportation was not included by EPRs in their planning documents, I was
hopeful that EPRs were considering electric transportation. I systematically reviewed the
webpages and documents for evidence that transportation fuels were considered in the
documents. I reviewed and sought out terms and passages that support the inclusion of
electric transportation and to code them in NVivo. As described in the data analysis
section, several passages were identified that, if read inclusively, support the idea that
some ERPs are considering electric transportation in their planning. Transferability was
attained, as all counties except for Solano and San Francisco had publicly available
emergency operations plans or transportation plans. The addition of the statewide and
federal documents also provided for a broad range of local differences, demographics,
and geography and different levels of ERP analysis.
This does not remove the key limitation of the geographic restrictions considered
in the study. Dependability was demonstrated through the note keeping process and the
description of the document gathering process. The inclusion of the dates of revision, and
the last search for any document updates from earlier in the review also enhances
dependability in case plans were modified during the research and analysis process. No
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updates were discovered between the start and conclusion of the research. Confirmability
occurred through logging decisions and choices, as well as preserving the ERP
documents in NVivo in case of subsequent plan changes. The results provide further
evidence of this analysis.
Results
The results are organized by each of the three research questions. The data were
analyzed primarily in NVivo, with supplemental analysis in Microsoft Excel, and I
provide quotes in support of the themes.
Research Question 1
From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response planners, as demonstrated
through public documents, what key factors, if any, do they take into account when
considering transportation needs of staff/administration reporting to work after an
earthquake?
The term staff was contained in 31 of the documents reviewed. Only six
documents used staff in the context of transportation. The California Public Health and
Medical Emergency Operations Manual (2011) stated, “During disasters, Operational
Area Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) will activate to coordinate information flow
and resource requests (e.g., medical supplies, staff, and personal protective equipment)”
(p. 132). Earthquake Country Alliance (n.d.) asked, “Would transportation issues affect
staff patient/resident access?” for determining exercise objectives (p. 3). Hughey and
Smith (2013) addressed a similar question “Are there earthquake related injuries to
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patients or staff at any health care impacted that access to the facility is impaired or
impossible?” (p. 11). These documents demonstrated that ERPs are aware of
transportation limitations after a disaster. The documents provided questions but not
specific answers to how transportation and staff access to hospitals are impacted. As the
documents were reviewed for the term staff, two new themes developed that could
answer this question: fuel and critical infrastructure.
Fuel. Fuel was one of the most common terms used by both medical and
transportation ERPs. The term fuel is included in federal, state, county, and local
documents. Fuel is used in emergency planning, hospital planning, and transportation
planning. I included the term electricity in the examination of fuel, as it is the fuel for
electric transportation. My review and analysis identified the term fuel in 22 (46%) of the
documents. Fuel was commonly associated with backup electrical generation; for
example, the California Association of Health Facilities (2017) identified “Emergency
Power Generator Type” and “Emergency Power Generator Fuel” in its emergency
operations program and plan manual (p. 8).
The term electricity was identified in 11 of the documents reviewed and was not
directly associated directly with transportation or as a transportation fuel. The Bay Area
Urban Areas Security Initiative (2017) listed as a capability outcome to provide within
the “first 12 to 72 hours of an incident . . . emergency power to critical facilities, fuel
support for emergency responders” (p. 219). Similarly, the City of San Jose Emergency
Operations Plan (2004) identified a need for alternatives for “power-dependent systems
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such as communications, water supply, fire fighting, and waste treatment.” (p. 40). San
Jose’s documents do not include transportation as one of the power-dependent systems.
The San Jose documents were dated to 2004, when electric transportation was in lower
use and not a broad state policy objective and when electric transportation was less
common. The San Mateo County Hazard Mitigation Plan, which was updated in 2016,
also excludes electricity for transportation, although the use of standby generators could
potentially generate electricity for transportation
BB-10—Critical Fuel Supply. Provide local fuel supply (none presently exists in
the community) capable of supporting 3-5 days of fuel needs for emergency
responders and standby generators (including those at water & sewer pump
stations). (Tetra Tech, n.d., p. 81)
The identified fuel needs by San Mateo do not include transportation as a critical
infrastructure.
Critical infrastructure. Medical ERPs generally included transportation as part
of their critical infrastructure. Medical ERPs often included multiple items as critical
infrastructure, including electricity and transportation. Electricity was most commonly
associated with water or with providing electrical needs and was not clearly associated
with electricity needed to operate transportation such as vehicles.
[Health care coalition] members should perform an assessment to identify the
health care resources and services that are vital for continuity of health care
delivery during and after an emergency. . . . This information is critical to
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uncovering resource vulnerabilities relative to the [hazard vulnerability analysis]
that could impede the delivery of medical care and health care services during an
emergency. . . . The resource assessment should include but is not limited to the
following:
• Critical infrastructure supporting health care (e.g., utilities, water, power,
fuel, information technology [IT] services, communications, transportation
networks). (Department of Health and Human Services, 2016, p. 14)
Tetra Tech (2018) identified energy, health care, and transportation systems as part of
critical facilities, consistent with Department of Homeland Security definitions of critical
infrastructure.
The Steering Committee has decided upon the following definition of Critical
Facilities for this planning process:
Critical facilities and infrastructure are those assets, systems, and networks,
whether physical or virtual, considered so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination, per the Department of Homeland Security. For
this hazard mitigation plan, the 16 critical infrastructure sectors as defined by
the Department of Homeland Security will be used. The 16 sectors are
[excerpted]:
•

Energy
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•

Health care and Public Health

•

Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste

•

Transportation Systems (p. 3).

In contrast, transportation ERPs focus on providing overall access, but have
minimal discussion of disasters and their direct relation to health care linked
transportation. For example, the Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission
(2018) only uses the term disaster in one paragraph and does not reference either
transportation or critical infrastructure for hospital staff.
Security/Emergency Services. Transportation systems can be greatly impacted by
natural disasters or security incidents. Transportation systems are also a critical
part of the response effort by connecting law enforcement and safety responders
to the incident site and handling the public’s transportation needs in response to
the incident. Consistent with the California Strategic Highway Safety Plan and
emergency relief and disaster preparedness plans, the 2040 RTP continues to
invest in projects that provide security and emergency services. (p. 6-6)
This gap between medical ERPs and transportation ERP was consistent between
documents reviewed.
Summary of ERP Planning for Staff and Administration Transit Needs
The documents review suggested ERPs are generally aware that staff and
administration arriving at hospitals after a disaster is a factor in emergency planning
albeit not a well-explored issue. Transportation planning documents touch upon the issue,
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but on the whole, focus on other issues than hospitals and staffing after disasters. Fuel is a
particularly common topic between health care and transportation. Usage was split
between emergency generation and transportation, but the connection between
emergency generation for transportation was absent. Linkages between transportation,
electricity, and health care have been identified in some of the documents, but similarly
have not been thoroughly explored in the ERP documentation.
Research Question 2
From the perspectives of Bay Area emergency response planners, as demonstrated
through public documents, what are the key factors that they take into account when
considering transportation needs of individuals needing assistance after an earthquake?
Needs of individuals needing assistance was generally subsumed within broader
transportation planning and hardening existing infrastructure. Infrastructure hardening
includes measures such as earthquake retrofitting. Bay Area ERP documents reviewed
included references to individual shelter in place plans. No further planning efforts were
revealed in my documentation review, with two exceptions: Napa County and Santa Cruz
County. Hughey and Smith (2013) identified damage to transportation channels as a key
factor for Napa County to take into account after an earthquake for hospital surge
capacity.
Damage to transportation channels. A significant risk associated with earthquake
is a disruption in transportation. Staff may not be able to reach their usual place of
employment. Pre-hospital care may not be able to deliver patients to acute care
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facilities. Patients may not be able to reach hospitals. Evacuation plans may be
disrupted. And, the usual vendors of materials and supplies may not be able to
reach the facilities in order to maintain needed supplies. (p. 11)
The Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission (2018) identified “transit
dependents” as people relying on transportation other than private vehicles.
Transit Dependent: An individual who because of age, income, physical/mental
condition, geographic location, or personal choice, does not have a private vehicle
available and relies on transit for his/her transportation needs. (GA-18)
My closer examination of the Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation
Commission document did not reveal how or where transit dependency was considered in
their plan. Because of this limited information, the focus appears greater on maintaining
emergency services rather than individual services. Accordingly, my review found
medical ERP and one transit ERP considered individual transportation as part of their
planning efforts but not extensively or in depth. At this point, the primary mechanism
ERPs have for individual assistance is sheltering in place and self-sufficiency, with
emergency transportation used for those who cannot shelter in place. Ready Marin (n.d.)
put this point most succinctly:
After a major disaster, professional first responders will be overwhelmed and your
neighborhood may be on its own for days. The primary objective of a
neighborhood response program is to do the greatest good for the greatest number
of people, and ensure assistance is available to those who need it most (para. 2).
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Ready Marin also included knowing which neighbors have generators. The timing
differences between the two documents that mentioned individual plans changed little
over the five years. Additionally, electrification of transportation was not listed for any
individual assessment or impacts on their ability to attain health care after a disaster in
the documents reviewed. The City of Fremont (2017) has a webpage dedicated to electric
vehicles and lists their benefits but no disadvantages. It had no further reference to
emergency planning.
Research Question 3
What are the differences in the emergency response plans for electric
transportation between cities and counties in the Bay Area?
Regarding differences in emergency response plans between cities and counties, I
found limited differences between cities and counties. The documents I reviewed showed
greater difference between medical and transportation ERPs than between areas of the
Bay Area. Electric vehicle advocacy was included in several transportation planning
documents, such as the City of Fremont (2017), the Transportation Authority of Marin
(2018), and the Sonoma County Transportation Authority (2016). The Sonoma County
Transportation Authority stated
the utilization of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs or EVs) has the potential to
reduce petroleum consumption and greenhouse gas emissions dramatically, and
increase energy independence through the utilization of locally produced energy.
[Later in the document, the Sonoma County Transportation Authority] identifies
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the increase in EVs that would be needed to meet the GHG reduction goals of the
CTP and discusses targets set by the state and CA2020 (p. 3-28).
The City of Fremont (2017) has 5,800 electric vehicles and “Fremont’s 94539 zip
code is home to more [electric vehicle] drivers than any other zip code in California!”
(para. 1). Statewide documents follow a similar pattern. California’s Governor Brown
issued Exec. Order No. B-48-18 (2018) and directed “all State entities [to] work with the
private sector and all appropriate levels of government to put at least 5 million zeroemission vehicles on California roads by 2030” (para. 11).
Most ERPs do not acknowledge this shift toward increased electric transportation.
Most ERPs included fuel as a key concern in their emergency planning, and several
included energy and transportation as critical infrastructure. Six ERPs included staff level
transportation concerns within their documents. More thorough examination and
consideration of the interrelated nature of electric and transportation critical
infrastructures is needed by ERPs, as the literature has already identified this issue, but in
practice the issue is lagging, as identified in the emergent themes.
Emergent Themes
Fuel was the primary emergent theme in reviewing the collected data. Fuel for
emergency planning focused primarily on fuel for generators, although several
documents included fuel for transportation. “Within the first 24 to 48 hours of an
incident, the County OES [Office of Emergency Services] has processes and procedures
in place to prioritize fuel needs and distribution among critical infrastructure (e.g.,
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hospitals and gas stations) and responders (e.g., public safety and utility crews)” (Bay
Area Urban Areas Security Initiative, p. 59). This theme emerged from the data, as
compared to the narrow initial key terms of electrification and alternative as related to
transportation. The examination of fuel allowed a more comprehensive examination of
what was contained in the ERP documents.
A second emergent theme was the date the document was provided or the date the
document was updated. Twenty-eight of the documents were updated before 2015 or
lacked an identifiable date. This theme would need broader analysis in a subsequent
study, as the impacts of the date and frequency of ERP is outside the scope of my study.
If the state and local governments did not have changing priorities regarding
transportation critical infrastructure, the lack of recent updates may not be a problem.
However, as critical infrastructure is changing, more frequent updates are likely
necessary to ensure that community resilience is maintained.
Summary
Transportation and emergency response planning in California is currently not
focused on additional needs associated with electrified transportation and the Bay Area’s
and state’s long-term objectives. As demonstrated through public documents, ERPs have
examined the need for fuel for vehicles and emergency power generation and, in some
cases, directed the planners to consider transportation as critical infrastructure or related
to energy. Transportation for staff, however, appears to be a secondary factor to other
considerations such as medical supplies. Individuals after an earthquake are largely
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relegated to sheltering in place, based on the ERP documents. Many ERPs, based on
references and links in emergency planning webpages at the city and county level,
assume that emergency services will be overwhelmed and direct the public to assume that
they may spend up to a week without service or assistance. Based on my interpretation
and analysis, there are essentially no differences in emergency response plans for electric
transportation between cities and counties in the Bay Area. Medical ERPs tended to have
greater focus on fuels than transportation ERPs. None of the documents included
electricity needs as a fuel for vehicles and transportation, although the City of San Jose
(2004) did include electricity as potentially transportation needs. This results in my
determination that there is no significant planning for electric transportation after a
disaster, as reflected in planning documents, despite the state’s directive for greatly
increased zero emission vehicles through 2030.
In Chapter 5, the purpose of the study and the findings implications are organized
within the conceptual framework of the study. Further research recommendations and
social change implications are provided, along with the conclusory remarks on the study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to assess the impacts resulting from
hospital staff, hospital administrators, and injured people using electric transportation
through a case study of emergency planning, public health, and transportation entities in
the nine-county San Francisco Bay Area Region. I posed three questions to understand
what role electric transportation has in ERP planning after an earthquake. I found that
transportation for staff was a secondary factor to other needs such as medical supplies.
My analysis also revealed that although transportation was considered a critical
infrastructure by some ERPs, there were no specific plans or documentation regarding
electric transportation. Lastly, there were no significant differences between city and
county plans, but there were differences between medical ERPs and transportation ERPs.
The medical ERPs tended to have a greater focus on fuels than do the transportation
ERPs.
Interpretation of the Findings
The findings confirmed the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, which included little
to no research on electric transportation and resilience. I reviewed literature on enhancing
electric grid reliability through discharging electric vehicle batteries because battery
discharge can help provide electricity to the electric grid when the cars are plugged in to
charging stations at home or at an office. I also reviewed literature about community
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resilience, and about transportation planning. My literature review led to finding a gap in
the consideration of electric transportation and its impact on community resilience.
Research Question 1
Fuel and generators but not electric transportation. The first research question
supported past findings in the literature review that transportation limitations after
disasters are considered by ERPs. For example, the Earthquake Country Alliance (n.d.)
specifically asked if transportation affects staff. Hughley and Smith (2013) focused on
staff injuries impacting health care. Fuel, an important resource as stated by both medical
and transportation ERPs, was identified in nearly one half of the documents reviewed but
most commonly in association with backup power generation for a facility. The City of
San Jose Emergency Operations Plan (2004) confirms this finding by identifying
“communications, water supply, fire fighting, and waste treatment” as “power-dependent
systems,” but not transportation.
These findings confirm that for the Bay Area, a transportation vulnerability state
will likely exist after a disaster or disruption, as a worsened state occurred after
hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Litman, 2006) and overall population health can be
worsened after a disaster (Morton, 2013). In this case, California’s environmental goals
could be lowered if health and safety issues for transportation are negatively impacted
after an earthquake. Because the ERPs are not currently considering how electric
transportation will affect their hospital services, a vulnerability state is more likely. With
increased planning, this potential vulnerability state could be avoided. Depending on
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needs, standby generators, such as those considered in the San Mateo County Hazard
Mitigation Plan, could be used if electric transportation is critical for staff at San Mateo
County hospitals (Tetra Tech, n.d.).
The document review identified a gap between medical and transportation ERPs.
Medical ERPs often included transportation as part of their critical infrastructure. The
Department of Health and Human Services (2016), a federal department, indicated that
the “resource assessment should include . . . critical infrastructure supporting healthcare,”
which included transportation networks (p. 14). This focus compared with the more local
Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission (2018), which used the word
disaster only one time and did not include transportation or critical infrastructure for
hospital staff. Instead, the Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission
referenced emergency services and first responders but not the needs for staff to arrive at
hospitals, or how the fuel network might be disrupted by a disaster. In contrast, Procyk
and Dhariwal (2010) identified the linkage between transportation and power. Similarly,
my study has confirmed that ERPs do consider transportation and has also confirmed that
electric transportation is not an area that ERPs are currently considering.
Research Question 2
Transportation, subcommunities, and individual preparedness are
considered. ERPs considered transportation after an earthquake but not how
transportation would be replaced if it were disrupted. Electricity for transportation was
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not one of the key factors I identified. The two key factors I identified were the
availability of transportation and the ability to shelter in place.
In terms of available transportation, Hughey and Smith (2013) argued that
disruption in transportation after an earthquake would prevent both staff and patients
from reaching hospitals in Napa County. Identifying a disruption is consistent with
community resilience, because a disruption is necessary to trigger the response to an
event (Longstaff & Yang, 2008). Depending on how many staff or patients can reach Bay
Area hospitals, the result may be resistance, resilience, or vulnerability. Identifying
transportation disruption makes it less likely that the community will result in
vulnerability because planning actions can be taken to address the potential vulnerability.
Additionally, the Santa Cruz County Regional Transportation Commission (2018)
identified transit dependents as a potential vulnerability but did not further explain how
planning for transit dependents was occurring. This recognition by the Santa Cruz
commission, as compared to Hughey and Smith (2013), is less likely to result in
resilience or resistance. Santa Cruz has not taken the additional steps to address how
transit dependents can arrive at a hospital. The type of transportation in Santa Cruz was
not identified either, so it was unclear if further transit dependent vulnerabilities would
exist if the electrical system were sufficiently disrupted compared to the availability of
gas supplies.
In terms of sheltering in place, Ready Marin (n.d.) indicated that people should
plan on being on their “own for days” and recommended people know which neighbors
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have generators (para. 2). Ready Marin acknowledged that transportation will be
vulnerable after a disruption and a neighbor with a generator may be able to provide
power to smaller electric transportation methods like a car. Because there is no disruption
in this circumstance where a generator is available to provide electric fuel for the car,
there would be a state of resistance. If instead, after the earthquake the electric car owner
purchased a generator, then there would be a state of resilience.
The balance of understanding infrastructure, its alternatives, and the consequences
from failed infrastructure was identified by SPUR (2013) during my literature review.
Ready Marin (n.d.) provided one potential solution to electric transportation’s reliance on
electricity but failed to take the final analytical step of including electric transportation as
the reason a community would need to know who has generators and where they are in a
community. Without identifying where there are generators, a vulnerability may exist in
Marin County’s planning efforts.
Electric transportation and getting electricity to transportation is not
considered. These findings suggest a disconnection between the literature and the ERP
planning documents in the Bay Area. The literature indicated infrastructure and its
alternatives as a key component for community resilience. For example, Procyk and
Dhariwal (2010) linked transportation and health care provision with electricity. Ready
Marin (n.d.), the Santa Cruz Regional Transportation Commission (2018), and Hughey
and Smith (2013) identified various aspects of disruptions and their impacts. None of
these three, however, made the linkage to electricity, transportation, and health care.
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Understanding that the Bay Area ERP documents have not made this connection
confirms that there is a disassociation between community resilience and the planning
efforts in the Bay Area.
Research Question 3
Differences are more distinct between medical and transportation ERPs than
between Bay Area cities and counties. Neither medical nor transportation ERPs had
emergency response plans for electric transportation. Medical ERPs had greater concern
over their resistance and resilience to transportation disruptions than transportation ERPs.
However, the most common thread between cities and counties was electric vehicle
advocacy. The City of Fremont (2017), the Transportation Authority of Marin (2018),
and the Sonoma County Transportation Authority (2016) all included resources
identifying the benefits, but not the vulnerabilities, of increasing electric transportation.
All three primarily focused on electric cars.
The City of Fremont (2017) enthusiastically stated, “Fremont’s 94539 zip code is
home to more [electric vehicle] drivers than any other zip code in California!” (para. 1).
The City of Fremont also describes benefits but does not list or provide documentation
for fueling an electric car if electricity is lost. This means the subpopulation of Fremont is
more vulnerable to disruption than other subpopulations (Adger, 2000).
The Sonoma County Transportation Authority (2016) stated that electric vehicles
have “the potential to reduce petroleum consumption and greenhouse gas emissions
dramatically and increases energy independence through the utilization of locally
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produced energy” (p. 3–28). Similar to the City of Fremont (2017), the Sonoma County
Transportation Authority does not address the increased vulnerability associated with
electricity powering transportation. The adaptation to help address climate change as a
positive adaptive capacity is creating a different vulnerability to earthquakes and their
disruption (Norris et al., 2007).
Medical and transportation ERPs should work together to better understand their
joint vulnerabilities to disruption and the impact to their critical transportation
infrastructures. As the Bay Area increases its electrical transportation penetration, the
ERPs will need to understand the changing vulnerability of transportation to electrical
disruptions. The common element identified between cities and counties was their
advocacy for increasing electric transportation for environmental objectives. The
Governor of California’s order in Exec. Order No. B–48–18 (2018) solidifies this
cooperation by ordering “all State entities to continue to partner with regional and local
governments to streamline zero-emission vehicle infrastructure installation processes
wherever possible” (para. 13). This conflict between environmental and other priorities
has occurred in Florida, as identified by Tobin (1999). The Bay Area should learn from
Florida’s mistakes and work to balance emergency planning with environmental planning
in order to enhance community resilience.
Community Resilience and ERPs
The Norris et al. (2007) community resilience theory served as the theoretical
foundation for this study. I reviewed documents to identify how electric transportation
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was considered for emergency planning. Planning can increase resilience, as it links
“adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of function and adaptation after a
disturbance” (p. 130). With each document reviewed I was able to identify different
themes to understand how and if ERPs were planning for electric transportation as part of
their emergency planning postdisaster.
Community resilience consists of the community and resilience. There can be
different elements of the same community. The Bay Area community was largely
homogenous within similar types of planning documents, or similar subpopulations of
ERPs. However, a difference in looking at fuel for transportation arose between
subpopulations of medical ERPs, who were concerned about fuel, and transportation
ERPs, who were not. This consideration of capabilities is consistent with Cutter et al.
(2008) and their identification of different resilience capabilities within subpopulations.
Several documents did consider the different subpopulations. Transportation was
identified as critical infrastructure for medical facilities such as hospitals (Santa Cruz
County Regional Transportation Commission, 2018). Fuel was a concern for medical
ERPs but not for transportation ERPs. The transportation ERPs were also concerned
about their transportation network, of which hospitals are one component, whereas
medical ERPs were concerned about making sure their specific facilities were able to
demonstrate resiliency. These different concerns are indicative of different
subpopulations, which indicates different resilience capabilities.
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The resilience capabilities of the hospital versus transportation subpopulations is
different. Hospitals need electricity or fuel for generators, staff, medical supplies, and a
way to get patients to the hospital. The medical ERPs identified these as issues in their
documents. On the other hand, transportation systems need fuel for the vehicles that use
them, and then construction materials in case the road or rail line fails. If a particular road
is damaged, other alternative routes typically exist, but at greater fuel cost or time.
Geographically constrained areas, like the Bay Area, are an exception to this resilience,
as seen in Figure 1. This makes their transportation networks less resilient.
Similarly, the increasing penetration of electric vehicles, with their fuel
limitations, decreases transportation resilience unless powering them is accounted for in
planning efforts. A decreased state of resilience is vulnerability (Norris et al., 2007). This
is consistent with Adger (2000), and the inclusion of a worsened state after a disturbance.
A different state may emerge after a disturbance. Bruneau et al. (2003) included lessening
future impacts as a definition of resilience. If planning does not occur, then the future
impact may be lessened if hospitals make requirements for nonelectric vehicles for key
staff in case there is a disaster. This would be resilience, a changed end-state (Adger,
2000; Longstaff & Yang, 2008; Norris et al., 2007). If planning does occur, then a
positive adaptation would be for hospitals to make available electric fuel sources for
transportation, such as solar panels or electric generators. This result is resistance, the
best outcome, where there is no disruption in response to the crisis (Longstaff, 2005;
Longstaff and Yang, 2008).
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With current electric vehicle penetrations, the outcome after a disruption is
unclear. Any of the three community resilience outcomes is possible: resistance,
resilience, or vulnerability. As electric vehicles increase in penetration, without proper
planning, Bay Area hospitals are likely to emerge from a disaster in a state of resilience
or a state of vulnerability.
Limitations of the Study
The primary limitation of the study was its focus on the Bay Area. The document
review and analysis led to the inclusion of state and federal planning documents, and
analysis of the state and federal planning documents. Local ERP use of state or federal
documents does not mitigate the specific geographic and other defining features of the
Bay Area.
An additional limitation I discovered during the research was the idea that
geography and distance constraints can place geographic restrictions on nonelectric
transportation. For example, a car that is nearly empty can travel the same distance as a
partially charged electric vehicle. If the gas stations do not have electricity, then gas
cannot be pumped for the car’s tank. This limitation on fuel and distance is discussed in
several studies, even though those studies do not discuss electric vehicle limitations
(O’Rourke, 2007; Procyk et al., 2010). These studies, however, differ from the
documents used by ERPs. The ERP documents, as described earlier, generally did not
include fuel in the limitations.
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A third limitation is that my study did not focus on the impacts of the timing and
frequency of ERP document updates. As technology or geographic constraints change,
ERP documents may need more frequent updates. For this study, over half of the
documents had been updated or created in 2016 or later, which may mean that timing and
frequency of updates is not a significant factor. These considerations are outside the
scope of my study.
Recommendations
Several recommendations emerged from my study. The first is that ERPs should
analyze their communities to understand how many of their staff use electric
transportation and thus are subject to vulnerabilities. Further research into this subject as
California and the Bay Area move toward having five million electric vehicles on the
road by 2030 is necessary to ensure that a new vulnerability in community resilience is
not being created (Exec. Order No. B–48–18, 2018, para. 11). Such research is consistent
with Barbera and Macintyre (2007), who stated that a hazard vulnerability analysis is
needed to prepare, respond to, and recover from a disaster. ERPs should also examine
their communities to understand if they have similar geographic limitations to the Bay
Area that can impact how far transportation can go after a disaster or disruption.
Second, ERPs should examine how fuel for transportation has affected their
communities during power outages when gas stations were not operational. Although this
study was focused on electric transportation, electricity is needed to operate gas stations.
Fuel was identified primarily for generators and first responders such as fire fighters, not
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for staff and their capability to arrive at a Bay Area hospital after an earthquake.
Electricity should be incorporated into ERP documents as a fuel type for transportation.
Third, ERPs should work on analyzing subpopulations, particularly electric
transportation users, to ensure that the subpopulations have appropriate community
resilience. The commonality between Bay Area ERPs on the benefits of electric
transportation needs to be matched by addressing the vulnerabilities of electric
transportation for hospitals. Performing a vulnerability analysis may let Bay Area ERPs
turn a vulnerability into a state of resistance or resilience (Cutter et al., 2003).
Fourth, further study is necessary to create quantitative metrics that allow a more
thorough and accurate assessment of vulnerabilities to transportation disruption for
hospitals based on a network analysis such as CORSIM or TRANSIMS (Naghawi and
Wolshon, 2010; Sisiopiku, 2007). Murray-Tuite (2006) identified the limitations to
DYNASMART-P, particularly the lack of generalization, suggesting the DYNASMARTP model is not particularly appropriate to the Bay Area; an analysis of a particular county
or city may be appropriate. Further research can develop the metrics needed to populate
these transportation models and help researchers and planners better understand if their
specific hospitals are subject to transportation disruptions. Such community resilience
planning may help turn potential vulnerabilities into a state of resilience or resistance and
allow the community to become more resilient and resistant.
Fifth, the academic community should work more directly with ERPs to better
develop and understand the linkages from community resilience theory with practice. The
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gap revealed by this study shows a general disconnect between changes in critical
infrastructure and planning. This gap persists in the Bay Area even though fuel and
transit have been identified for many years in the literature as being critically important
(Dorbritz, 2011; Procyk et al., 2010).
Implications
Positive Social Change
This study revealed a gap at the policy and societal level between community
resilience and emergency disaster planning occurring in the Bay Area. This is the first
time that a case study approach has applied community resilience to ERPs in the Bay
Area. With California’s electric vehicle goals, the increased prevalence and reliance upon
electric transportation will only exacerbate staffing challenges when an earthquake
occurs.
These challenges can still be addressed in the Bay Area by encouraging planners
to review the impacts of electric transportation on their hospital staffing, and to begin
developing plans sooner rather than later. This will ensure that ERPs are prepared for
electrification of the transportation sector and that this change for environmental
objectives will not increase the vulnerability of hospitals to disruptions. Several Bay Area
cities and counties are at the forefront of attaining and working towards the electric
transportation targets contained in Exec. Order No. B–48–18 (2018). To mitigate
potential vulnerability and hospital service degradation or disruption after an earthquake,
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I will share my findings with the appropriate ERPs and other entities, such as the
California Office of Emergency Services.
Implications for Community Resilience
The findings are consistent with community resilience theory. Previous
researchers have emphasized a need for quantitative analysis of community resilience;
several used quantitative modeling tools. My findings show that ERPs may not be aware
of the potential impacts of transportation electrification. Without this awareness, it may
be difficult to develop the quantitative data necessary to assess community resilience and
the impacts of transportation electrification. Further research is needed to see how
community resilience can be adapted to situations with poor quantitative data and the
specific impacts that planning has on changing resistance, resilience, and vulnerability.
Conclusion
Norris et al. (2007) applied resilience to communities and identified resilience as
“processes linking a network of adaptive capacities (resources with dynamic attributes) to
adaptation after a disturbance or adversity” (p. 127). Transportation generally has
dynamic attributes, as road closures can impact how far drivers need to travel. With
proper planning and consideration of other dynamic attributes such as fuel source,
adaptation can occur after a disaster like an earthquake. Currently, adaptation may occur
after a disaster and a state of vulnerability. The results of this study show that electric
transportation and how to power it following an earthquake has not considered by ERPs
in the Bay Area. Before electric transportation levels increase to the targets set by the
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state of California, planning efforts need to adapt so that ERPs are prepared before a
disaster—not after one.
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